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Abstract. Decentralized techniques are becoming crucial and ubiqui-
tous with the rapid advancement of distributed ledger technologies such
as the blockchain. Numerous decentralized systems have been developed
to address security and privacy issues with great dependability and reli-
ability via these techniques. Meanwhile, formalization and verification of
the decentralized systems is the key to ensuring correctness of the design
and security properties of the implementation. In this paper, we propose
a novel method of formalizing and verifying decentralized systems with a
kind of extended concurrent separation logic. Our logic extends the stan-
dard concurrent separation logic with new features including communi-
cation encapsulation, environment perception, and node-level reasoning,
which enhances modularity and expressiveness. Besides, we develop our
logic with unitarity and compatibility to facilitate implementation. Fur-
thermore, we demonstrate the effectiveness and versatility of our method
by applying our logic to formalize and verify critical techniques in de-
centralized systems including the consensus mechanism and the smart
contract.
Keywords: Decentralized system · Extended concurrent separation logic
· Formal methods · Consensus · Smart contract
1 Introduction
Nowadays, decentralized technology has evolved into a new stage with the ad-
vancement of many kinds of decentralized techniques such as the consensus
mechanism, smart contract. Based on these decentralized techniques, numerous
solutions have been proposed to circumvent security and privacy issues widely
existing in centralized systems such as unauthorized disclosure, deception, dis-
ruption, and usurpation, which is attracting a huge amount of attention from
both academy and industry. These solutions have been developed as decentral-
ized systems and applied to a wide range of fields such as economics [7], the
Internet of things [11], smart health [13], and infrastructures [12]. However, it is
challenging to ensure the correctness and properties of decentralized techniques
and systems due to the high complexity of the design and intricate factors.
Formal methods play an important role in verifying complex systems by
specifying systems with rigorous mathematical syntax and semantics to elimi-
nate imprecision and ambiguity of the design and implementation. Significant
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contributions have been made to verify distributed systems with two main-
stream techniques of formal methods including model checking and automated
theorem proving. Model-checking techniques [22,15,33] prove to be effective to
check safety and liveness properties of distributed system design and algorithms.
However, it is noteworthy that these model checking techniques suffer from the
state-space explosion problem, which leads to the ineffectiveness of complicated
realistic systems, though many model-checking tools such as SPIN [19], NuSMV
[9], Cubicle [10] provide space-efficient and on-the-fly algorithm to optimize the
methods. Meanwhile, theorem proving techniques [17,27,31] provide a deductive
method to prove the correctness and properties of distributed systems in a math-
ematical style without the requirement of the exploration of the state space. To
date, the proof assistant is the main tool for the development of formal proofs
with the collaboration of humans and machines such as Coq [35] and Isabelle
[20]. These formal methods make it possible to locate design flaws and imple-
mentation pitfalls and ensure correctness and properties. Particularly, sound
logic is imperative in formal reasoning about program correctness. Concurrent
separation logic (CSL) [25] has been widely used to reason about concurrent sys-
tems such as cryptographic implementation [2], the concurrent operating system
kernels [38]. As the extension of separation logic [23,21], CSL enhances the mod-
ularity to reason about resources locally, which makes it capable of formalizing
the disjoint concurrency and inter-process interactions.
Admittedly, it is natural that decentralized technology highly requires the
guarantee of correctness and system properties since there is no central entity to
supervise and monitor network and system behaviors, especially in untrustwor-
thy environments. Nevertheless, formal reasoning about decentralized systems
with the standard CSL is restrictive.
– CSL lacks encapsulated components to reason about the communication that
is the basic and non-negligible component in the specification of decentralized
systems to formalize interactions.
– CSL has restrictive expressiveness of reasoning about the environment factor
and temporal conditions that can facilitate formalizing complex protocols of
decentralized systems.
– CSL focuses on reasoning about low-level programs such as memory man-
agement and resource relationship. It is restrictive for CSL to reason about
high-level systems such as nodes in decentralized systems.
Hence, it is still a significant challenge to reason about decentralized systems
with an effective logic with rich expressiveness and high modularity.
In this paper, we propose a method of formalizing and verifying decentralized
systems with an extended concurrent separation logic with three novel features:
communication encapsulation, environment perception, and node-level reason-
ing. These features are developed to bridge the gulf of reasoning about decen-
tralized systems with CSL. We encapsulate the formalization of communications
as the basic specification and proof component. Besides, our logic enriches the
expressiveness of CSL with the capability of environment perception. The en-
vironment perception also extends CSL into two-dimension reasoning including
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both spatial and temporal reasoning. Moreover, we introduce the node-level rea-
soning to enable our logic to formalize high-level decentralized systems, which
enhances the modularity to specify and verify systems at different levels.
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
1. We propose a novel method of formalizing and verifying decentralized sys-
tems with a kind of extended concurrent separation logic. Our logic addresses
the issues of CSL while reasoning about decentralized systems with novel fea-
tures including communication encapsulation, environment perception, and
node-level reasoning.
2. We formalize a consensus mechanism with our method to prove the effec-
tiveness of reasoning about complex protocols in decentralized systems with
our logic. Our logic simplifies high-level reasoning with great modularity and
rich expressiveness. It also presents unitarity while reasoning about systems
at different abstraction levels.
3. We also demonstrate our work by applying our logic to the specification
and verification of smart contracts. We locate the design flaw of a typical
smart contract with vulnerability to prove the effectiveness of formalizing
and verifying decentralized applications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We give a short intro-
duction to the related work in Section 2. We then illustrate our logic that is the
core of our method in Section 3. Subsequently, we describe the method of the ap-
plication of our logic in a consensus algorithm and a smart contract in Section 4.
We discuss our work in Section 5, followed by the conclusion in Section 6.
2 Related work
Prior work has made significant contributions to the formalization and verifi-
cation of distributed systems such as [31,1,15,33]. Model checking and theorem
proving are two main methods in these works with the support of typical tools
such as HOL4 [16], TLC model checker [39], NuSMV [9]. In addition, reasoning
about distributed systems with Hoare-style logic has also proved effective. Iron-
Fleet [17] was proposed to build practical and provably correct distributed sys-
tems based on the blend of TLA-style state-machine refinement and Hoare-logic
verification. DISEL [32] provided a framework for implementation and compo-
sitional verification of distributed systems and clients based on the distributed
separation logic. Particularly, our logic improves the work [14] to make it prac-
tical to formalize and verify the decentralized systems.
In the meanwhile, the decentralized technology has been rapidly developed to
address the common issues in centralized distributed systems since Bitcoin [29].
Due to the lack of supervision from central entities, ensuring the correctness and
properties of decentralized systems during the development is imperative. For-
mal verification provides a mathematical approach to analyze the decentralized
system in a rigorous manner. However, the specific research of the formaliza-
tion and verification of decentralized systems just gets started with the boost of
decentralized technology.
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As one of the critical techniques in decentralized systems, the consensus
algorithm has been applied with formal methods to ensure the correctness in
the distributed environment. The agreement safety property of the PBFT [8]
was proved in [28]. Besides, the Raft [24] state replication library was formally
verified by Verdi [37], a framework for formal verification of distributed systems
implemented in Coq.
In recent years, formal verification of smart contracts has been an attractive
topic since TheDAO attack [3] that brought great damage to the cryptocurrency
market and successfully transferred about $50M worth of Ether into the control
of the attacker by exploiting the reentrancy vulnerability. In the prompt work
[6], they proposed a method to translate smart contracts implemented in Solidity
to F* [34] and decompile Ethereum virtual machine (EVM) bytecode into F*
for formal verification. Later, model-checking-based approaches were proposed
for formal verification of smart contracts. In the work [4], SPIN has been used
to verify the correctness and properties of a smart contract template to reduce
the potential errors.
The EVM that supports the execution of smart contracts has also been for-
mally specified and verified. In [18], the formal specification of the EVM bytecode
named KEVM was developed with K framework [30], which provides the founda-
tions for the verification. A deductive verifier was constructed in [26] to precisely
reason about possible behaviors of the EVM bytecode with KEVM.
3 Our Logic
The standard CSL has great significance in reasoning about concurrent programs
with preeminent expressiveness. It is noteworthy that the standard CSL and
typical variants can well support the formalization of parallel systems at the
thread level or process level about memory management and resources. Our
logic is compatible with CSL and inherits the capability of formalizing low-level
systems. Based on that, we extend the standard CSL into formalizing high-level
decentralized systems with better modularity and richer expressiveness.
3.1 Communication Encapsulation
In a decentralized system, communications among nodes are indispensable. It is
hard for CSL to formalize the complex interactions among programs in an elegant
manner. Hence, we simplify the formalization by encapsulating communications
as the basic component.
Our logic defines a minimal program unit over (Var,Ch) in (1).
P , (L,A, E , ↪→, L0, g0) (1)
Here, Var is a set of typed variables and Ch is a set of channels. L is a
set of locations and A is a set of actions. E denotes the effect function A ×
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JVar K 7→ JVar K. The notation ↪→ ⊆ L×‖Var ‖×A×L represents the conditional
transition relation. L0 ⊆ L and g0 ∈ ‖Var ‖ denotes a set of initial locations and
the initial condition respectively. JVar K denotes the set of variable evaluations.
‖Var ‖ denotes the set of Boolean conditions over Var .
For convenience, we use the notation l
g:α
↪−−→ l′ as shorthand for (l, g, α, l′) ∈↪→
where l ∈ L and α ∈ A, meaning that the program P goes from location l to l′
when the current variable evaluation η |= g. We connect the program unit with
CSL by specifying l
g:α
↪−−→ l′ as {g} α {g′}, where E(α, η) |= g′.
Let c!s denote sending signal s via channel c and c?v denote receiving a
signal from channel c and assign the signal to variable v. A communication pi ∈
Π = {c!s, c?v} is an action where c ∈ Ch, s ∈ Dom(c), v ∈ Var with Dom(v) ⊇
Dom(c).
In a practical communication scenario, the finite asynchronous channel is
commonly used. The essence of a finite asynchronous channel is a buffer with a
capacity Cap(c) ∈ N+ and a domain Dom(c). In this manner, a communication
c!s produces signal s into the buffer whereas a communication c?v consumes a
signal from the buffer while assigning it to variable v.
For example, two parallel programs c!s and c?v can be specified at a high
specification level in (2).
{s 7→ −} c!s ‖ c?v {JvK = JsK} (2)
We can give a proof outline of this parallel system containing the communi-
cation between two parallel programs in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Proof outline of {s 7→ −} c!s ‖ c?v {JvK = JsK}.
Since we encapsulate the formalization of communications as the basic com-
ponent, we have Π ⊆ A. The specification of communications can be automati-
cally verified in the manner of Fig. 1.
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3.2 Environment Perception
Our logic has the capability of perceiving the environment factors including
foreign factor and native factor, which means that we can formulate specifications
with both internal (native) and external (foreign) temporal conditions.
In our logic, we follow the style of Hoare triples as (3).
{Γ, γ ∧ P} α {Γ, γ′ ∧ P ′} (3)
Here, Γ is used to specify the foreign pre-conditions and post-conditions while
γ and γ′ are used to specify the native pre-conditions and post-conditions. P
and P ′ are assertions with the same semantics of the standard CSL. α ∈ A is
the action to change the state of programs.
Before illustrating the structure of the environment factor, we firstly intro-
duce a partially ordered relation / defined in (4).
a / a′ ⇐⇒ a = Pred(a′) (4)
Here, a, a′ ∈ A´ and Pred(a) denotes the predecessor action set of a. A´ is the
set of occurred actions derived from a partial function A ⇀ A´.
We use the notation a / a′ as shorthand for (a, a′) ∈ /. Intuitively, a / a′
means that action a happens before action a′. Furthermore, the relation / has
transitivity that is a / a′ / a′′ =⇒ a / a′′. With this ordered relation, we define
a finite action path % as a finite action sequence a0a1...an such that ∀i ∈ [0, n) :
(ai, ai+1) ∈ /, where n ≥ 1 if the length of the sequence is greater than 1.
Here, we use the finite action path as the atomic proposition that can be
formulated as the environment factor to express that the occurrence of actions
in the path must be true. In fact, the environment factor can be formulated in
any temporal logic such as linear temporal logic (LTL) to formalize temporal
properties as conditions.
We consider a simple network consisting of two parallel programs. One pro-
gram sends a signal s through channel c while another program receives a signal
from channel c.
The sending program specified in (5) does not need to perceive the environ-
ment factor, meaning that it can send s at any time.
{>,> ∧ s 7→ −}
c!s
{>, c!s}
(5)
The receiving program can only execute the receiving action after perceiving
that the signal has been sent, which is specified in (6).
{>, v 7→ −}
{c!s, v 7→ −}
c?v
{c!s, c?v ∧ JvK = JsK}
(6)
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To give the proof for environment extension, we introduce Environment
Composition Rule in (7).
{Γ0, Υ0} α0 {Γ0, Υ ′0} ... {Γn, Υn} αn {Γn, Υ ′n}
{~ni=0Υi} α0 ‖ ... ‖ αn {~ni=0Υ ′i}
(Environment Composition Rule)
(7)
For brevity, we use Υ to denote the conjunction of γ and P . The big star
notation ~ni denotes consecutive separating conjunction from index i to n.
It is notable that the inference in Environment Composition Rule elim-
inates the foreign environment naturally if we regard the proved parallel system
as the highest level of specification.
In the example above, we can specify two programs locally and combine the
local specifications to produce a high-level specification in Fig. 2. The verification
can be done with Environment Composition Rule.
Fig. 2. Specification of the network in Section 3.2.
The capability of the environment perception enhances the expressiveness
and extends the standard CSL into temporal formalization. The new proof rule
also preserves the modularity to formalize a complex system with environment
factors by permitting reasoning about programs locally.
3.3 Node-Level Reasoning
In decentralized systems, nodes are distributed in the network and interact with
each other under specific protocols including communication protocols and exe-
cution protocols. Each node in the network perceives states of others by commu-
nication protocols regularizing the way of passing information in the network.
With the information perceived from communication protocols and local states,
a node enforces execution protocols with corresponding parameters. According
to the scope of communication and execution protocols, it is reasonable to regard
the enforcement of communication protocols as the foreign environment while
the enforcement of execution protocols being the native environment.
In node-level reasoning, communications from programs on the same node
and on other nodes can be distinguished with the introduction of node-level
parallelism. Besides, the temporal conditions imposed by other nodes can be
used as the environment factors while specifying a parallel system on a node.
For instance, to do action c!s1, the sending program on node N needs to satisfy
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that another program on node N has received a signal s0 from another node
N ′ through channel c and assigned s0 to variable v, which can be specified as
{c!s0@N ′ / c?v@N, s1 7→ −} c!s1 {>, c!s1}.
To facilitate formalizing and verifying the node and the interactions among
nodes, we extend the CSL with the support of the node parallel. We introduce
Node Environment Composition Rule in (8) and Node Composition
Rule in (9).
{Γ0, Υ0} α0@N {Γ0, Υ ′0} ... {Γn, Υn} αn@N {Γn, Υ ′n}
{Γˆ ,~ni=0Υi} α0@N ‖ ... ‖ αn@N {Γˆ ,~ni=0Υ ′i}
(Node Environment Composition Rule)
(8)
{Γ0, Υ0} α0@N0 {Γ0, Υ ′0}...{Γn, Υn} αn@Nn {Γn, Υ ′n}
{~ni=0Υi} α0@N0 ‖N ... ‖N αn@Nn {~ni=0Υ ′i}
(Node Composition Rule)
(9)
Here, N denote a set of nodes. We have N0, .., Nn ∈ N. @ is the ownership
relation between action and node. (α,N) ∈ @ denotes action α happens at node
N , meaning that node N has the ownership of action α. We use the notation
α@N as shorthand for (α,N) ∈ @. ‖N is the notation for node-level parallel to
distinguish with program-level parallel ‖. For a node N , the foreign environment
Γ includes the temporal conditions imposed by other programs on N and the
temporal conditions imposed by other nodes. Γˆ denotes the foreign environment
without the temporal conditions imposed by other programs on N .
In Node Environment Composition Rule, the foreign environment fac-
tors on node N are composite in the inference with the persistence of the tempo-
ral conditions imposed by other nodes and the elimination of conditions imposed
by other programs on N . Local specifications on different nodes can be combined
to make a high-level specification with Node Composition Rule.
4 Application
In this section, we present two practical applications to show how our method
works with our logic including a consensus mechanism and a smart contract.
These are two critical decentralized techniques widely used in decentralized sys-
tems. By formalizing and verifying them, it proves the effectiveness of our method
applied in decentralized systems.
4.1 Consensus Mechanism
We use our logic to formalize the consensus mechanism, a critical role in decen-
tralized techniques. Hashgraph [5] is a recently developed consensus algorithm,
which adopts a directed acyclic graph (DAG) structure and proves effective in
permissioned blockchain.
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Let us recall the data structures in Hashgraph. An event e is a tuple defined
in (10).
e , 〈TS,TX,SH,OH 〉 (10)
Here, TS denotes a timestamp signed by the creator. TX is a set of transac-
tions embedded into the event. SH and OH denote pointers pointing to a self-
parent and an other-parent respectively. In this manner, all events associated
with a set of transactions compose a DAG.
For a node N , we consider an immutable transaction list T to persist trans-
actions accepted in the network. T is used to simplify the DAG structure. The
acceptance is the alternative of round received. There is a set of events E asso-
ciated with a set of transactions TX on N . Each event is either accepted by N
or rejected by N . For brevity, we introduce two notations 	 and ⊕ to denote
acceptance and rejection. Formally, we have definitions in (11).
	e , t ∈ e.TX =⇒ t /∈ T
⊕e , t ∈ e.TX =⇒ t ∈ T
	E , ∀e ∈ E : t ∈ e.TX =⇒ t /∈ T
⊕E , ∃e ∈ E : t ∈ e.TX =⇒ t ∈ T
(11)
In this paper, we consider a small network to illustrate our methodology of
reasoning about the Hashgraph mechanism in an outline. With the support of
modular reasoning, our logic can reason about nodes and programs on nodes
separately.
There are four nodes N0, N1, N2, N3 in the network. Each node is deployed
with programs enforcing the Hashgraph consensus mechanism. Generally, there
must be at least one program for broadcasting events to other nodes and one
program for receiving events from other nodes. All programs run in a concurrent
manner.
We specify the outline of the consensus mechanism for a set of transactions
TX in Fig. 3, where # denotes the occurred action that receives transactions
from a client. Ei is a set of events created on node Ni. Let e
i
j denotes the jth
event on node Ni where j ∈ N, we have ∀eij ∈ Ei \{ei0} : eij .SH = H(eij−1) where
H is the hash function. P (Ni)′ is the post-condition of node Ni, which specifies
the termination condition of the consensus on TX. For instance, we have P (N0)
′
as follows:
P (N0)
′ = {♦RR(E0)@N1∧♦RR(E0)@N2∧♦RR(E0)@N3),♦RR(E0)@N0∧JE0K = ⊕E0},
where RR(E) denotes the action round received, meaning that an event e ∈ E
is accepted in some round. In this application, we use LTL to formulate the
environment factor. Here, ♦ is a temporal modality denoting eventually.
This is a high-level specification of the whole network to verify that all nodes
will eventually get the consistent T. With the support of Node Composition
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Fig. 3. Specification of the event consensus in Hashgraph network.
Rule, we can break down the specification and focus on specifying and verifying
programs on nodes separately. On each node, there is a parallel system containing
a set of programs, which can also be formalized separately.
Besides, We can combine several highly coupled programs as a module. For
instance, famous witness election is a critical module to make the Hashgraph
algorithm converge. Recall the concept of witness in Hashgraph that is the first
event a node creates in each round. Each node will decide its witness events after
executing action round created. The election is for witnesses to vote on a witness
before the current round to determine whether it is famous. In fact, the vote is
virtual, which means that there is not an actual vote based on communications
formed in the network. The voting process is enforced on the local environment.
Here, for a vote function, we can specify it as (12).
{>,♦See(e, e′) ∧ IsWitness(e) ∧ IsWitness(e′)} Vote(e, e′) {>, IsFamous(e, e′)}
(12)
Here, the specification has the meaning that if a witness e can see another
witness e′, then e votes e′ as a famous witness and the ballot is signed with e.
Besides, vote collection is also enforced on the local environment in the round
after voting. Each node can make the election by itself without synchronous
interactions with others based on a directed acyclic graph that is a data structure
that can be trivially formalized in the standard CSL.
In this manner, our logic can effectively formalize such a module with mod-
ular reasoning and other critical modules such as see and strongly see with the
support of environment perception.
4.2 Smart Contract
We follow the unitarity principle to unify the specification and verification of
decentralized systems at different abstraction levels with our logic. Besides com-
plex protocols such as consensus mechanisms, our logic can also specify and
verify the decentralized applications developed by smart contracts.
We take a simple example of the smart contract slightly modified from
[6], which is similar to the behavior of TheDAO attack. It defines a contract
named MyBank with three functions Deposit() for depositing money, With-
draw(amount::Integer) for withdrawing money, and Balance() for looking up
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Listing 1.1. Pseudocode of Malicious contract
1 cont rac t Mal i c ious {
2 . . .
3 func t i on Drain ( ) {
4 myBank . Deposit . va lue ( amount ) ;
5 myBank . Withdraw . va lue ( amount ) ;
6 }
7
8 func t i on ( ) {
9 myBank . Withdraw . va lue ( amount ) ;
10 }
11 . . .
12 }
the balance. Another contract named Malicious behaves maliciously with two
evil functions Drain() to trigger the malicious behavior and a fallback method,
which is shown in Listing 1.1.
With our logic, we can specify the contract MyBank in Listing 1.2.
Then, we consider a concurrent specification and introduce a resource invari-
ant RIb where resource b is the balance. We have RIb , b ≥ 0. The function
Withdraw is specified in (13) from a high-level while Deposit is specified in the
same manner.
{c?msg ∧ c?a,RIb ∧ JbK = n}
Withdraw(a)′
{>,RIb ∧ JbK = n− a} (13)
The function msg.sender.call.value in List 1.2 transfers control back to con-
tract Malicious by invoking the fallback method. In the fallback method, a reen-
trant call Withdraw() is triggered in another thread or process of MyBank′ as
the shadow of MyBank, which can be specified in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Specification of the parallel smart contract system.
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Listing 1.2. Pseudocode of MyBank contract
1 cont rac t MyBank {
2 . . .
3 {c?msg, balances[msg.sender] 7→ −}
4 func t i on Deposit ( ) {
5 {>, Jbalances[msg.sender]K = n}
6 ba lances [ msg . sender ] += msg . va lue ;
7 {>, Jbalances[msg.sender]K = n + msg.value}
8 }
9 {>, Jbalances[msg.sender]K = n + msg.value}
10
11 {c?msg ∧ c?amount, balances[msg.sender] 7→ −}
12 func t i on Withdraw ( amount : : I n t e g e r ) {
13 {>, Jbalances[msg.sender]K = n ∧ n ≥ amount}
14 i f ( ba lances [ msg . sender ] ≥ amount ) {
15 msg . sender . c a l l . va lue ( amount ) ;
16 ba lances [ msg . sender ] −= amount ;
17 }
18 {>, Jbalances[msg.sender]K = n− amount]}
19 }
20 {>, Jbalances[msg.sender]K = n− amount]}
21 . . .
22 }
We can obtain that the specification of this parallel smart contract system
cannot be proved in any inference rules while preserving the resource invari-
ant and satisfying the post-condition if both MyBank contract program and its
shadow program MyBank′ are verified separately. Therefore, the design flaw is
located. In this manner, our logic can prove the correctness of smart contracts
and assist in finding design flaws in decentralized applications.
5 Discussion
The core of our method of formalizing and verifying decentralized systems is
our extended concurrent separation logic. Our logic presents rich expressiveness
with the encapsulation of communication formalization and the capability of en-
vironment perception. It also has great modularity with the node-level reasoning
feature to enable formalizing decentralized systems from memory level to node
level. Furthermore, the formalization and application at different abstraction
levels present unitarity with unified forms.
In the meanwhile, our logic has compatibility, which allows the interpretation
from our logic to the standard CSL. We have proved the soundness of our logic by
the general structure of [36]. We have also mechanized our logic by an interpreter
together with a mechanized CSL prover implemented in the Coq proof assistant
to implement the applications in Section 4. However, it is not dependable to
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reduce our logic to the CSL for automated reasoning by the interpreter. We plan
to mechanize our logic directly with the proof assistant.
We do not address formulating temporal properties as temporal conditions in
the environment factors in this paper. However, it is straightforward to formulate
them in temporal logic. For instance, we can express temporal properties with
LTL formulae such as {φ,>} α {>,>} to add the constraint for the occurrence
of α with the LTL formula φ.
6 Conclusion
Reasoning about decentralized systems during the development is indispensable
to ensure the correctness and system properties since it is a significant challenge
to establish trust without central entities in untrustworthy distributed envi-
ronments. In this paper, we have proposed a novel method of formalizing and
verifying decentralized systems with an extended concurrent separation logic
enhanced by three novel features: communication encapsulation, environment
perception, and node-level reasoning. Besides, we have applied our method to
reason about the consensus mechanism to prove the effectiveness of reasoning
about complex protocols with the support of new features. Furthermore, we have
demonstrated the capability of formalizing and verifying smart contracts with an
instance to locate the design flaw. Particularly, we follow the unitarity principle
and compatibility principle to facilitate the implementation. We plan to optimize
the mechanization of our logic directly with the proof assistant. Formalizing and
verifying a more complicated decentralized system such as a blockchain platform
is also on our schedule.
References
1. Aminof, B., Rubin, S., Stoilkovska, I., Widder, J., Zuleger, F.: Parameterized model
checking of synchronous distributed algorithms by abstraction. In: International
Conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation. pp. 1–
24. Springer (2018)
2. Appel, A.W.: Verification of a cryptographic primitive: SHA-256. ACM Transac-
tions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS) 37(2), 1–31 (2015),
iSBN: 0164-0925 Publisher: ACM New York, NY, USA
3. Atzei, N., Bartoletti, M., Cimoli, T.: A survey of attacks on ethereum smart con-
tracts (sok). In: International conference on principles of security and trust. pp.
164–186. Springer (2017)
4. Bai, X., Cheng, Z., Duan, Z., Hu, K.: Formal modeling and verification of smart
contracts. In: Proceedings of the 2018 7th International Conference on Software
and Computer Applications. pp. 322–326 (2018)
5. Baird, L.: The swirlds hashgraph consensus algorithm: Fair, fast, byzantine fault
tolerance. Swirlds, Inc. Technical Report SWIRLDS-TR-2016 1 (2016)
6. Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Gollamudi, A., Gonthier, G.,
Kobeissi, N., Kulatova, N., Rastogi, A., Sibut-Pinote, T., Swamy, N.: Formal verifi-
cation of smart contracts: Short paper. In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop
on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security. pp. 91–96 (2016)
14 Y. Ding and H. Sato
7. Bhme, R., Christin, N., Edelman, B., Moore, T.: Bitcoin: Economics, technology,
and governance. Journal of economic Perspectives 29(2), 213–38 (2015), iSBN:
0895-3309
8. Castro, M., Liskov, B.: Practical Byzantine fault tolerance. In: OSDI. vol. 99, pp.
173–186 (1999), issue: 1999
9. Cimatti, A., Clarke, E., Giunchiglia, E., Giunchiglia, F., Pistore, M., Roveri, M.,
Sebastiani, R., Tacchella, A.: Nusmv 2: An opensource tool for symbolic model
checking. In: International Conference on Computer Aided Verification. pp. 359–
364. Springer (2002)
10. Conchon, S., Goel, A., Krsti, S., Mebsout, A., Zadi, F.: Cubicle: A parallel SMT-
based model checker for parameterized systems. In: International Conference on
Computer Aided Verification. pp. 718–724. Springer (2012)
11. Ding, Y., Sato, H.: Bloccess: Towards Fine-Grained Access Control Using
Blockchain in a Distributed Untrustworthy Environment. In: 2020 8th IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Mobile Cloud Computing, Services, and Engineering
(MobileCloud). pp. 17–22. IEEE (2020)
12. Ding, Y., Sato, H.: Dagbase: A Decentralized Database Platform Using DAG-
Based Consensus. In: 2020 IEEE 44rd Annual Computer Software and Applications
Conference (COMPSAC). IEEE (2020), to appear
13. Ding, Y., Sato, H.: Derepo: A Distributed Privacy-Preserving Data Repository
with Decentralized Access Control for Smart Health. In: 2020 7th IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/2020 6th
IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (Edge-
Com). IEEE (2020), to appear
14. Ding, Y., Sato, H.: Extending concurrent separation logic to enhance modular
formalization (2020)
15. Fatkina, A., Iakushkin, O., Selivanov, D., Korkhov, V.: Methods of Formal Software
Verification in the Context of Distributed Systems. In: International Conference
on Computational Science and Its Applications. pp. 546–555. Springer (2019)
16. Gordon, M.J., Melham, T.F.: Introduction to HOL: a theorem proving environment
for higher order logic. Cambridge University Press (1993)
17. Hawblitzel, C., Howell, J., Kapritsos, M., Lorch, J.R., Parno, B., Roberts, M.L.,
Setty, S., Zill, B.: IronFleet: proving practical distributed systems correct. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 25th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles. pp. 1–17 (2015)
18. Hildenbrandt, E., Saxena, M., Rodrigues, N., Zhu, X., Daian, P., Guth, D., Moore,
B., Park, D., Zhang, Y., Stefanescu, A.: Kevm: A complete formal semantics of
the ethereum virtual machine. In: 2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations
Symposium (CSF). pp. 204–217. IEEE (2018)
19. Holzmann, G.J.: The model checker SPIN. IEEE Transactions on software engi-
neering 23(5), 279–295 (1997), iSBN: 0098-5589 Publisher: IEEE
20. Isabelle, https://isabelle.in.tum.de/
21. Ishtiaq, S.S., O’hearn, P.W.: BI as an assertion language for mutable data struc-
tures. In: Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Prin-
ciples of programming languages. pp. 14–26 (2001)
22. Konnov, I., Veith, H., Widder, J.: On the completeness of bounded model checking
for threshold-based distributed algorithms: Reachability. Information and Compu-
tation 252, 95–109 (2017), iSBN: 0890-5401 Publisher: Elsevier
23. O’Hearn, P.W., Pym, D.J.: The logic of bunched implications. Bulletin of Sym-
bolic Logic 5(2), 215–244 (1999), iSBN: 1079-8986 Publisher: Cambridge University
Press
Formalizing and Verifying Decentralized Systems with Extended CSL 15
24. Ongaro, D., Ousterhout, J.: In search of an understandable consensus algorithm.
In: Proceedings of the 2014 USENIX conference on USENIX Annual Technical
Conference. pp. 305–320 (2014)
25. Ohearn, P.W.: Resources, concurrency, and local reasoning. Theoretical computer
science 375(1-3), 271–307 (2007), iSBN: 0304-3975 Publisher: Elsevier
26. Park, D., Zhang, Y., Saxena, M., Daian, P., Rou, G.: A formal verification tool for
Ethereum VM bytecode. In: Proceedings of the 2018 26th ACM Joint Meeting on
European Software Engineering Conference and Symposium on the Foundations
of Software Engineering. pp. 912–915 (2018)
27. Rahli, V., Guaspari, D., Bickford, M., Constable, R.L.: Formal specification, veri-
fication, and implementation of fault-tolerant systems using EventML. Electronic
Communications of the EASST 72 (2015), iSBN: 1863-2122
28. Rahli, V., Vukotic, I., Vlp, M., Esteves-Verissimo, P.: Velisarios: Byzantine fault-
tolerant protocols powered by Coq. In: European Symposium on Programming.
pp. 619–650. Springer (2018)
29. Raval, S.: Decentralized applications: harnessing Bitcoin’s blockchain technology.
” O’Reilly Media, Inc.” (2016)
30. Rou, G., erbnut, T.F.: An overview of the K semantic framework. The Journal of
Logic and Algebraic Programming 79(6), 397–434 (2010), iSBN: 1567-8326 Pub-
lisher: Elsevier
31. Sardar, M.U., Hasan, O., Shafique, M., Henkel, J.: Theorem proving based formal
verification of distributed dynamic thermal management schemes. Journal of Par-
allel and Distributed Computing 100, 157–171 (2017), iSBN: 0743-7315 Publisher:
Elsevier
32. Sergey, I., Wilcox, J.R., Tatlock, Z.: Programming and proving with distributed
protocols. Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages 2(POPL), 1–30
(2017), iSBN: 2475-1421 Publisher: ACM New York, NY, USA
33. Souri, A., Rahmani, A.M., Navimipour, N.J., Rezaei, R.: A symbolic model check-
ing approach in formal verification of distributed systems. Human-centric Comput-
ing and Information Sciences 9(1), 4 (2019), iSBN: 2192-1962 Publisher: Springer
34. Swamy, N., Hricu, C., Keller, C., Rastogi, A., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Forest, S.,
Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Strub, P.Y., Kohlweiss, M.: Dependent types and
multi-monadic effects in F. In: Proceedings of the 43rd Annual ACM SIGPLAN-
SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages. pp. 256–270 (2016)
35. Welcome! | The Coq Proof Assistant, https://coq.inria.fr/
36. Vafeiadis, V.: Concurrent separation logic and operational semantics. Electronic
Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 276, 335–351 (2011), iSBN: 1571-0661
Publisher: Elsevier
37. Wilcox, J.R., Woos, D., Panchekha, P., Tatlock, Z., Wang, X., Ernst, M.D., An-
derson, T.: Verdi: a framework for implementing and formally verifying distributed
systems. In: Proceedings of the 36th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming
Language Design and Implementation. pp. 357–368 (2015)
38. Xu, F., Fu, M., Feng, X., Zhang, X., Zhang, H., Li, Z.: A practical verification
framework for preemptive OS kernels. In: International Conference on Computer
Aided Verification. pp. 59–79. Springer (2016)
39. Yu, Y., Manolios, P., Lamport, L.: Model checking TLA+ specifications. In: Ad-
vanced Research Working Conference on Correct Hardware Design and Verification
Methods. pp. 54–66. Springer (1999)
